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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\\"ILLIA"l L. POLLEI andESTHID
L. POLLE!, his wife,
Plaintiffs a11d Rcspo11dc11ts,
vs.

!
·. Case No.
I

11775

.J
and LEXOHE \
)l. Bl IH_Tl'.. R, his wife,
Defendants ruul Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

FCllTI-IEH STATE)IENT OF FACTS
The facts surrounding the acknowledgment of
Exhibit P-1 are not recited in appellants' statement of
t'aets but at pages 7 and 8 of appellants' brief.
Exhibit P-2, the warranty deed, was acknowledged
Huth I. Smith on .May 28, HW2, and the mortgage
tr1 Zions Savings Bank (Exhibit P-3) was acknowll'Uged the same date by the same person. The Uniform
1

Real Etate Contract date<l :\lay 26, 196:2 was acknowJ.
edged January 7, 1964 before Helen R. Fife.
Mr. Pollei testified that he was in Elko when tbt
contract was signed as it was just a formality with hin;
and he <loesn't know Helen Fife ( R-50). He furthtr
testified that it was he who had the Uniform Reai
Estate Contract recorde<l in January 1964 and that he
was present when the notary signed it ( R-51). He ahl,
testified that the property prior to sale was in the narnt
of his wife (R-50).
l\Irs. Pollei testifie<l at first that Helen Fife wa1
at the bank (R-47), that the contract was signed at
the bank with the Polleis and 'Vursts all present (R
48). Upon further questioning she testified that Helen
Fife is secretary to Peter Lowe and that she and her
husband went there to have the contract acknowledged
(R-48) and that Des Townsend and Verda Lynn sent
them there ( R-50) .

ARG Ul\IENT
Point 1. Are the respondents precluded under
Utah law from asserting a vendor's lien?
Point 2. 'Y as there a defective acknowledgment
of the contract?
Point 3. Are plaintiffs estopped to assert or han
they waived a vendor's lien?

2

'<l'i.

Pui11t 1. Arc tlic
precluded under ['tali
from as.iertinq a vendor's lien?
The contract (Exhibit P-1) provides:
"The
shall ulitain a $25,000 loan from
Zion's First X ational llank and apply the net
proceeds therefrom to the purchase ot this property. The Buyers shall assign a $10,000 contract
knmvn as the Lawrence R. Grover contract to
the Sellers. The balance of $5,000 shall be paid
at the rate of $56.15 per month beginning on
July 1, 1962, and on the first day of every month
thereafter until fully paid."

This plainly provides that a first mortgage must
he given to Zion's First N atoinal llank and that the
balance is to be paid in two ditf erent ways, by assignment of a contract which is the equivalent of a payment
,1f
with a final balance of $5,000 to be paid
monthly.
To carry out this contract a warranty deed was
1'(i\·m immediatley (Exhibit P-2) and simultaneously
with the mortgage to Zion's First National Bank (Exhibit P-3), both dated .May 28, 1962. and recorded
29, 1962. Then the vendees made the payments
of $56.15 per month until in 1964 there was some
difficulty about collection (R-40, 41). The real estate
contract was then recorded upon the advice of an attorney and a real estate broker (R-42, 50), and then paymc11ts continued until 1966 (R-40), appellants ha,·ing
purchased the property in April 1966 (Exhibit P-8) .
Th( District Court held that the plaintiffs had a ,·e11-

3

dor's lien of which the defeudauts had constructi\t
notice through recordation and that plaintiffs wert
entitled to foreclosure of their lien ( R-:20, 21).
Existence of a vendor's lien is recognized in
CJS, Vendor and Purchaser, §396 and §401, the latter
citation in paragraph ( b) ( :2) says in part:
"\V?erc a
or purchase-money note
reservmg a vendors lien is recorded, a subsequent purchaser takes with notice of the
lien. \Vhere an instrument executed by the purchaser showing that he withholds a portion of
the purchase price, is recorded, a subsequent
purchaser takes with notice of the lien."
45 Arn. Jur., Records, §87, p. 469 is similar.
Vendor's lien is recognized in Bell v. Jones, 104
Utah 306, 139 P2d 884, and in M cM urdie v. Chug,<1,
99 Utah 403, 107 P2d 163, 132 ALR 440; and in Peterson v. Carter, 11 Utah 2d 381, 359 P2d 1055, cited by
appellants.
In M cMurdie (supra) vendors made an agreement
to sell property to Chugg and thereafter executed a
warranty deed conveying the property, leaving part
of the purchase price unpaid and evidenced by promis·
sory notes for the balance due under the contract.
Vendor's administrator brought the action to foreclose
the vendor's lien as having priority over claim of homestead by the Chuggs and the court held the vendor's
lien to be valid.

Petersou v. Carter (supra) does not deny the exist-
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cnce of a vendor's lien, but
holds that the vendor
\la!'\ precluded from asserting liens of the vendor where
tht yendor and vendee had gone into a joint undertaking with the land, the vendor controlling the funds
which were due him and he disbursed them to others
and then sought to hold the vendee.
In Larson v. 1lletcalf, 201 Iowa 1208, 207 N.\\'.
:38:2, 45 ALR 344, the court recognized the vendor's
lien against a subsequent purchaser, holding that the
lien "follows the property sold into the hands of the
heirs, and even future vendees with notice," which notice
can be either actual or constructive.
The recording of the C niform Real Estate Contract was more than two years before purchase of the
property by the defendants-appellants. Such recordation, under Section 57-3-2 U.C.A. 1953

'· * * *

shall, from the time of filing the same
with the recorder for record, impart notice to all
persons of the contents thereof; and subsequent
purchasers, mortgagees and lien holders shall be
deemed to purchase and take with notice."

Point 2. Was there a defective ackrwwledgment
of the contract?
The plaintiffs, who gave the acknowledgment on
the uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit P-1), were
the vendors and were the claimants of the lien, or in
the position of equitable mortgagors. Section 57-1-6
e.C.A. l!J53 provides in part:
5

"E ,·ery conn::yaIH.'e u f real estate, and e'·er
instrume11t of" riti11g setti11g forth an
to com·ey any real estate or whereby any rea'
may be affected. to operate as notice tl:
third
shall be proYed or acknow !edged
and certified 111 the manner prescribed by th 11
title and recorded in the office of the
of the county in which such real estate is
a td
e , ***"
The form of acknowledgment is established by
Section 57-2-7, which was used by the notary on
hibit P-1.

E;.

It is true that an alternate form is established by
Section 51-2-8 where the grantor is unknown to the
officer, but appellants adduced no facts to establish
those facts. l\Ir. Pollei said he didn't know Helen Fife
( R-50) ; but l\Irs. Pollei knew her ( R-48, 50) and there
was no testimony that Helen Fife did not know both
of the Polle is. It is the notary's lack of acquaintarm
with the signers and not the lack of acquaintance r);'
the signers with the notary \vhich permits the use 01
the alternate form.
There are no facts in this case which bring it within
the authority cited by appellants in their brief on page 8
Poiut 3. A re plaintiffs estoµpcd to assert or hat't'

they ·waived a vendors lien?
In JJJc)}l urdic v. Clwyr; (supra) this court stated:
"It is a well-established rule of law that a
yendor docs uut wai,·e his \Tndor's lien for the

6

purchase pril'l' simply hy laki11g thl' n·ndce·s
own personal note for the amount due. If the
ycn_dor aecepts tht'
of a third party
or 1f he expressly wa1,·es his lien it ma\· be extinguished hut the taking of the
unsecured promissory note of the huver cannot be
held to bl' a waiYer of the lien." ·
.).} A.111 . .fur .• Yl'ndor a11<l Purchaser,
itii. it is stated:

p.

"Contractual prodsions as to the consideralio11
to he paid by the purchaser are ordinarih- not
merged in the dee<l, and accordingly, e\·idencc
of such contractual provisions is admissible to
show what consideration is to be paid bv the
purchaser although a deed has been accepted.
In case of deeds, the recital of the consideration
is not conclusive as regards the actual consideration, and it mav be shown bv oral eYidence that
a different or greater consideration was agreed
to be paid."
It is also stated in 55 Am . .I u r., Y endor and Purdrn:'ier, §4u:l, that existence of an action at law to recm·er the purchase price does not preclude an equitable
adion to establish a Yendor's lien. In their action against
the original yendees the plaintiffs in no way released
the ,·ernlor's lien, which had been recorded two years
after the giYing of the original warranty deed. It appears that in this case the appellants' title examiner
failed to pick up the recordation of the real
eontract (see testimony of Larsen of
Land Title Company, R-5!l, 60, Exhibit D-10 as of
3 1 tifi). Plaintiffs acted promptly by notifying the
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appellants promptly of the existence of the lieu whu 1
the appellants moYed into the property ( U-45-46,
an<l Exhibit P-5).
The authorities cited by appellants at pages 8 and
n are not applicable where the contract, as it due:i 11 :
Exhibit P-1, recites that following the raising u!
$25,000 on a first mortgage and acceptance of $10,0011
as a payment in the form of assignment of other
with a balance of $5,000 to be paid monthly,
the limited purpose of the deed and that there is unpaid
money due the vendor over a period of three years.
No facts suggest any waiver or relinquishment ot
the vendor's lien. Without releasing the property tht
plaintiffs tried in vain to collect the money from the
original ven<lees. There is no evidence that this prejudiced defendants in any way.
Plaintiff-respondents pray for affirmance of the
Judgment and Decree of the District Court.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS &

"rATKINS

By Richard L. Bird, Jr.
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents
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